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Abstract
This paper develops a monopoly model in which two vertically dierentiated
goods are supplied and involve a within-product network externality. Within this
model, I examine how the cost of the high-quality good aects the rm's prot
and welfare, demonstrating a surprising result that both the prot and welfare are
U-shaped in the cost and thus, in particular, a decrease in the marginal cost can
reduce the monopoly prot. I show that the assumptions of the fullled expectations
equilibrium and multi-product monopoly lead to this counter intuitive possibility.
Furthermore, changes in production costs and in quality yield cannibalization such
that the consumption of one good increases while that of the other decreases.
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1 Introduction
The majority of smartphone carriers sells both high- and low-quality smartphones.1 In
this industry, network externalities exist both across the products supplied by the same
rm and within products (i.e., all consumers of a good gain as the number of users who
purchase the same smartphone device increases). The existence of these network exter-
nalities motivate one to explore the market with (i) a within-product network externality
and (ii) multi-product rms.2 However, to my knowledge, no study has examined the
positive and normative consequences of such a market.
Incorporating a within-product network externality into a multi-product monopoly
model, this paper examines rm and consumer behavior and the resulting market con-
gurations.3 First, I nd that under certain conditions, cannibalization arises namely an
increase in the number of consumers of one good occurs at the expense of those of other
goods sold by same rm (Copulsky, 1976).4 Second, I show a counterintuitive result that
a decrease in the marginal cost of a high-quality good can reduce the rm prot. More
precisely, the prot becomes U-shaped in the marginal cost of the high-quality good.
Third, the relationship between welfare and the marginal cost becomes U-shaped.5 Two
assumptions play a key role in these striking results. The rst is the fullled expectations
equilibrium, according to which \ consumers' expectations about the sizes of the networks
are given" (Katz and Shapiro, 1985, pp. 427{428). In this case, the rm cannot commit
itself and thus is unable to transfer the network sizes optimally in response to the change
1An example of vertical dierentiation between iPhone and Android smartphones
in found in Geekbench (see http://browser.primatelabs.com/geekbench2/1030202 and
http://browser.primatelabs.com/android-benchmarks).
2Kitamura (2013) denes this externality as follows: \A consumer who purchases a product from a
certain rm gains a network benet when other consumers purchase the same product from the same or
dierent rm."
3I use a monopoly model to isolate the implication of a within-product network externality and a
multi-product rm and to stress that the result holds even in the absence of strategic interactions among
oligopolistic rms. The oligopoly case will be left to future research.
4The relevance of cannibalization has been established empirically. For instance, Ghose et al. (2006)
and Smith and Telang (2008) nd that 16% of used books, 24% of used CDs, and 86% of used DVDs
directly cannibalize new product sales at Amazon.com.
5While in Lahiri and Ono(1988), they nd that under cournot oligopoly a marginal cost reduction in
a rm with a suciently low share decreases welfare, in this paper, under monopoly I show the similar
result caused by two key assumptions: fullled expectations equilibrium and multi-product rm.
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in the marginal cost.6 The second important assumption is that of a multi-product rm.
After making this assumption, the cost reduction leads to cannibalization so that the
transition of network within rm aects prot and welfare.
The prot U-shaped in the marginal cost implies that a cost reduction, either through
innovation or through an R&D subsidy, can decrease the rm prot. Here, let us consider
a monopoly rm supplying two vertically dierentiated products, namely a high-quality
good and a low-quality good. Then, the rm's U-shaped prot in relation to the pro-
duction cost suggests that such a cost reduction will decrease the monopoly prot if the
production cost of the high-quality good is high and the degree of the cost reduction is
small. The reason is that the equilibrium concept of fullled expectations means the rm
cannot optimally transfer the network of the low-quality good to that of the high-quality
good when the marginal cost of the latter decreases. Thus, the positive eect on the
rm's prot from the high-quality good does not dominate the negative eect from the
low-quality good in spite of the cost reduction. More importantly, a drastic cost reduction
is needed to increase the prot. The result is that a small R&D subsidy is detrimental
rather than benecial.
There is a large literature on network externalities and multi-product rms. Katz
and Shapiro (1985) are the rst to formulate a duopoly model with a network externality
across both rms' products.7 Baake and Boom (2001) and Chen and Chen (2011) re-
spectively consider an oligopoly and a duopoly model of vertical product dierentiation
with a network externality in which rms decide their degree of product compatibility.
However, each rm only supplies one product, not multiple products. In this paper,
the degree of compatibility is exogenous but a single rm produces two types of prod-
ucts. By contrast, Haruvy and Prasad (1998) analyze a market in which a monopolist
sells high- and low-end versions of the same product and derive the conditions under
which producing both goods is optimal with a network externality. On the other hand,
6This equilibrium concept, proposed by Katz and Shapiro (1985), has been used in the literature
on network industries (e.g., Barrett and Yang, 2001; Hahn, 2003). In contrast to Katz and Shapiro
(1985), whose main result holds irrespective of whether consumers form an expectation before the output
decision, my result crucially depends on the assumption that consumers form an expectation before the
output decision.
7For more extensive surveys, see Katz and Shapiro (1994) and Shy (2001).
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Desai(2001) considers two segments duopoly markets for high-quality and low-quality
goods represented by Hotelling type model without network externality. He examines
whether the cannibalization problem aects a rm's price and quality decision. However,
in their models, the two goods are sold in dierent markets, each with dierent types of
consumers. Instead, I assume that both goods are supplied to the same market.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and Section 3 derives
the main results. Then, Section 4 shows the comparative statics. Section 5 concludes,
and Appendix provides the proofs of the results in the main text.
2 The Model
This section presents the model. While I basically follow Katz and Shapiro (1985), who
consider an oligopolistic network industry, I modify their model in two ways. First, I
assume a monopoly to eliminate the strategic eect between the rms. Second, this
single rm produces two vertically dierentiated goods which may involve a network
externality. In what follows, I describe the market equilibrium after characterizing the
behavior of the rm and consumers.
I begin by considering the rm's behavior. Suppose a monopolistic rm producing
two goods (H and L) that dier in their quality, and let VH and VL (VH > VL) denote
the quality of each good. For simplicity, I assume that VH = (1 + )VL, where  > 0
measures the degree of quality dierence, and that the quality of good L is normalized
to one (i.e., VL = 1). The marginal cost of producing each good is given by cH and cL,
respectively, which satisfy cH > cL = 0. Then, the rm's prot is dened by
(pH   cH)xH + pLxL; (1)
where x and p, for  = H;L, are the output and price of good , respectively. The
monopolist chooses outputs to maximize (1).
To derive the inverse demand functions, I now describe the behavior of consumers.
Following Katz and Shapiro (1985), consider a continuum of consumers characterized by
a taste parameter  that is uniformly distributed in [ R; r]; R; r > 0 with density one.8
8I assume that R is large enough to avoid a corner solution.
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By purchasing one unit of good , consumer  2 [ R; r] obtains a net surplus9
U() = V + Vg
e
   p;  = H;L, (2)
where the rst term in the right-hand side is the intrinsic utility of consuming the good
and the second term represents a network externality. Parameter  > 0 measures the
degree of the network externality and ge is the expectation over the network benet,
which takes the form
ge  g(xe) = xe;  = H;L: (3)
Where, xe is the expectation of output level of good . Therefore, Eq. (3) represents the
within-product externality.
Based on these preparations, I now derive the inverse demand functions. When con-
sumer ^ is indierent between purchasing good H and good L, it must hold that
UH

^

= UL

^

> 0
() (1 + )^ + (1 + )geH   pH = ^ + geL   pL:
Thus, the index of this consumer is obtained as
^ =
1

fpH   pL   ((1 + )geH   geL)g: (4)
Furthermore, there should be a consumer L who is indierent between purchasing
good L and nothing. The index of such a consumer satises
UL (L) = 0;
and, hence, is obtained as
L = pL   geL: (5)
Then, from (2), (4), and (5), and given that UL() is increasing in , I have
9Baake and Boom (2001) adopt a similar expression for the consumer surplus.
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UH(^) = UL(^) > UL(L) = 0;
which is equivalent to
^ > L: (6)
The following lemma follows from this result.10
Lemma 1. Any consumer  2 ( R; L) buys nothing, while consumer  2 ( L; b) (
2 [b; r]) buys good L (good H ).
From Lemma 1, the market-clearing conditions of goods H and L are
r   ^ = xH ; r   L = xH + xL:
Substituting (4) and (5) into these equations and solving for pH and pL yields the inverse
demand functions:
pH = (1 + )(r + g
e
H   xH)  xL; pL = r + geL   xH   xL:
Thus, the prot in (1) can be rewritten as
f(1 + )(r + geH   xH)  xL   cHgxH + fr + geL   xH   xLgxL: (7)
Having described the behavior of the rm and consumers, I now derive the market
equilibrium. For this purpose, I employ Katz and Shapiro's (1985) concept of the fullled
expectations equilibrium, which requires that consumers' expected quantities equal the
actual outputs. In addition, the rm chooses the outputs after taking consumers' expec-
tations about the network size as given. From (7), the rst-order conditions for prot
maximization are
 (1 + )xH + (1 + )(r + geH   xH)  xL   xL   cH = 0;
 xH   xL + r + geL   xH   xL = 0:
(8)
10See the Appendix for the proof.
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In addition, to guarantee positive outputs in equilibrium, I make two additional assump-
tions:
0 <  <
2(1 +  p1 + )
1 + 
; (9)
and
cH < cH < cH ; (10)
where cH = (1 + )r=2 and cH = (2     )r=(2  ).
The equilibrium outcomes are obtained from ge = x
e
 = x and (8):8>>><>>>:
 (1 + )xH + (1 + )(r + geH   xH)  2xL   cH = 0
 2xH   2xL + r + geL = 0
geH = xH
geL = xL:
Then, the equilibrium outputs and prices are
xH =
(2  )f(1 + )r   cHg   2r
Z
; xL =
 (1 + )r + 2cH
Z
; (11)
and
pH =
r(1+)(2 2 )+f(1+)2 3(1+)+2gcH
Z
; pL =
2r(  )+cH
Z
; (12)
where Z = (1+)(2  )2  4 > 0 by (9). These outcomes lead to the equilibrium prot:
 = 1
Z2
h
f(2  )2 + 2gc2H   2rf2(2  )2 + 22 + (3   4)gcH
+r2(1 + )(2(   2)2 + 42 + ( 8 + 5)
i
: (13)
This completes the description of the model.
3 U-Shaped Prot
Based on the results in the previous section, this section demonstrates that the rm prot
is U-shaped in the marginal cost of the high-quality good. The proof of the results are
left in Appendix.
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3.1 Output
First, I consider the eects of an increase in the marginal cost of producing the high-
quality good on each quantity, as described in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. An increase (decrease) in cH leads to cannibalization, such that it
reduces (raises) the output of the high-quality good and raises (reduces) the output of the
low-quality good.
This proposition is a natural result, since the rm would like to produce a relatively
ecient product.11
3.2 Prot
Next, I address the eect on the rm prot, which can be stated in
Proposition 2. Suppose a within-product network externality exists. Then, the rm
prot is U-shaped in cH .
This is illustrated in Figure 1.
Insert Figure 1 here.
This result implies that a small cost reduction can decrease the monopoly prot. When
cH is high enough, the rm does not moderate cost reduction. In other words, the rm
does not accept an innovation or subsidy unless it is able to drastically reduce cH . This
proposition suggests that if cH is suciently high, a decrease in it reduces the rm's
prot.
As emphasized in the Introduction, the assumption that consumers form their ex-
pectations before the output decision is crucial to the above result.12 To see why, let
11The same property is conrmed in Kitamura and Shinkai (2013), who consider a duopoly market
without a network externality.
12This assumption implies that a monopolist's announcement of its planned level of output has no
eect on consumer expectations.
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us drop this assumption. That is, I compare this case with the case in which the rm
can control both its output and the expected network size; it maximizes the prot with
taking ge = x into consideration. Then, I have the following lemma.
Lemma 2. In the monopoly model with the fullled expectations equilibrium derived
above, if cH increases, then marginal changes in the equilibrium quantities of good H and
L are less than when the rm can control the expected network size.
I have assumed that the rm takes the expected network size as given (i.e., it cannot con-
trol the expected network size). However, the expected network size must coincide with
the actual network size in equilibrium. In other words, the monopolist choose outputs to
maximize the prot without recognizing that the expected network size is equal to the
actual network size. This lack of information leads the rm to either under-produce or
over-produce compared with the case in which the rm can control the expected network
size. Indeed, in the present model, if cH increases, then the monopolist produces more of
good H and less of good L compared with the case in which it can control the expected
network size. To check this result, let us compute the rst-order conditions when the
rm can control the expected network size:
(1 + )(
@gH
@xH
  1)xH + (pH   cH)  xL = 0; ( @gL
@xL
  1)xL + pL   xH = 0:
By contrast, if the rm cannot control the expected network size, the corresponding
conditions are
 (1 + )xH + (pH   cH)  xL = 0;   xH + pL   xL = 0:
When the monopolist can control the expected network size, an increase in output aects
the network externality as represented by @g=@x = 1. This dierence in the rst-order
conditions results in Lemma 2. In fact, when the rm can control the expected network
size, the equilibrium outputs are as follows:
xCH =
(1  )f(1 + )r   cHg   r
2(1 + )(1  )2   2 ; x
C
L =
 r(1 + )r + cH
2(1 + )(1  )2   2 ;
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where superscript C indicates the case in which the rm can control the expected network
size. Then, I can show that
@xCH
@cH
  @x

H
@cH
< 0;
@xCL
@cH
  @x

L
@cH
> 0:
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is explained from Proposition 1 and Lemma 2.
According to these, a decrease in cH increases the output of good H and decreases that of
good L. However, these changes are not as drastic as in the case when the rm can control
the expected network size. Thus, the rm cannot aggressively transfer the network of
good L to that of good H in spite of the decrease in cH , and the positive eect on the
prot from good H is not able to dominate the negative eect of good L. This nding is
impossible, however, if the rm can control the expected network size.
Indeed, we can observe this fact more plausibly as follows. I consider the eect of
an increase in cH on the prot from producing each individual good: 
 = H + 

L 
(pH   cH)xH + pLxL. Using this decomposition of prots, I have the following lemma.13
Lemma 3. H is monotonically decreasing in cH , and 

L is monotonically increasing
in cH .
Figure 2 illustrates this lemma.
Insert Figure 2 here.
Given this lemma and Figure 2, when cH decreases by a suciently large amount, the
negative eect on L (i.e.,
@L
@cH
) dominates the positive eect on H (i.e.,
@H
@cH
). Accord-
ingly, if cH is initially high, a decrease in cH reduces the overall prot. The opposite
holds when cH is low enough.
Remark 1. One natural question regarding to Proposition 2 is whether the prot
continues to be U-shaped in cH even if the two goods are compatible. To answer it, I
modify the form of network externality (3) as follows:
ge  g(xeH ; xeL; ) = xe + xe ;  = H;L;  6= ; 0 <   1;
13Note that the lemma requires the existence of positive equilibrium outputs: (9) and (10).
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where  is a parameter that measures the degree of compatibility between the two goods.
The following proposition gives an armative answer to the above question.
Proposition 3. Suppose that a within-product network externality and partial com-
patibility ( < 1) exist between the two dierentiated goods. Then, the rm's prot is
U-shaped in cH .
This proposition implies that the rm's prot can decrease when cH decreases except
for the case of  = 1 as long as a within-product network externality exists.
If  = 1, then ge = x
e
H + x
e
L ( = H;L). Because the two goods are fully com-
patible, this case corresponds to the case analyzed by Katz and Shapiro (1985), that is
there is the within-rm network externality. Then, we nd that the rm's prot is a
monotonically decreasing function of cH . However, the case of fully compatible goods
is a special situation,14 because I consider the within-product network externality, and
fully compatible products do not have individual networks. This result implies that the
within-product network externality oers dierent equilibrium outcomes and properties
to the within-rm network externality established in Katz and Shapiro (1985).
Remark 2. Thus far, I have assumed that a monopolist's announcement of its
planned level of output has no eect on consumer expectations. Then, another natural
question is whether the prot continues to be U-shaped in cH even when its announcement
of output level partially aects consumer expectations. In order to address it, I modify
the form of network externaity (3) as follows:
ge  g(xe; x; ) = x + (1  )xe  = H;L; 0    1:
In this formulation, the monopolist's announcement of its output level has x inuence
on consumer expectations. With this generalization, I can obtain:
14See the Appendix for a special case, that is, @

@cH
jcH=cH = 0 only if  = 1.
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Proposition 4. Suppose that a within-network externality exists between the two
dierentiated goods and the monopolist's announcement of its planned level of output
partially aects ( < 1) consumer expectations. Then, the rm's prot is U-shaped in cH .
Thus, the rm's prot is U-shaped in so far as its announcement of outputs imperfectly
(that is when 0   < 1) eects on consumer expectations.
When  = 1, ge = x( = H;L). As mentioned in Lemma 2, this implies that the
monopolist can perfectly control the expected network size. Then, it chooses the output
levels to maximize the prot with understanding that the consumer expectations are
equal to the actual network size. Thus in the same way as reasons of Proposition 2, the
rm's prot is monotonically decreasing in cH only when  = 1.
4 Further Discussion
In this section, I address two issues that are important but have not been discussed in
the last section. One is related to social welfare, while the other is the eect of .
4.1 Welfare
First, I examine the welfare eect of a change in cH . Noting that welfare is equal to the
sum of the consumer surplus and the rm's prot, it is dened by
W  
Z ^
L
( + gL)d +
Z r
^
(1 + )( + gH)d   cHxH
=
(1 + )r2
2
+ (1 + )(r   ^)gH + (^   L)gL  
(L)
2
2
  (^
)2
2
  cHxH
=
(1 + )r2
2
+ (1 + )xHg

H + x

Lg

L  
(r   xH   xL)2
2
  (r   x

H)
2
2
  cHxH ;
where superscript  indicates the equilibrium outcome. Lengthy manipulations allow me
to have a notable relationship W  = 3=2. Hence, the following result is immediately
obtained.
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Proposition 5. Suppose that a within-product network externality exists. Then, social
welfare is U-shaped in cH .
This proposition is natural since the consumer surplus is larger when cH takes an
extremely large or small value and only one side of the network is larger than it is when
cH takes an intermediate value and each network size is small.
15 Recalling Remark 1
and discussion after Proposition 3, I immediately nd that welfare with fully compatible
products ( = 1) is a monotonically decreasing function of cH because, in that case, the
network size of each product is always the sum of the network sizes of both products.
Proposition 2 and 5 imply that a drastic cost reduction is needed to increase the
prot and welfare when the production cost of the high-quality good is high. Then, as
a mentioned in Section 1, these suggest that if the production subsidy is insucient,
subsization can reduce both the rm's prot and welfare.
4.2 Eect of  on Outputs
Throughout this paper, I have focused on the eect of cH . Finally, I consider the eect
of an increase in the quality of the high-quality good  on each quantity, as stated in the
following proposition.
Proposition 6. An increase in  leads to an increase (decrease) in xH(x

L).
This proposition is also interesting because cannibalization occurs as a result of not
only cH but also .
16 That is, an increase in  has a contrasting eect in the sense
that it raises (reduces) xH(xL). The intuition for this proposition is as follows. A larger
dierence in the quality of the two goods implies that the high-quality good is superior
to the low-quality good, which has a positive eect on the utility of the consumer. Thus,
when the quality dierence of the two goods becomes large , the monopolist has an
incentive to increase xH . In such a case, cannibalization occurs as it raises xH while
15The consumer surplus is also U-shaped in cH .
16In Proposition 1, the change in the parameter of supply side cH causes cannibalization, while in
Proposition 6, that of demand side  leads to cannibalization.
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xL decreases. Conversely, when the dierence in the quality of the two goods decreases,
the consumer does not value the high-quality good over the low-quality good. Thus, the
monopolist will expand xL since it is costly to produce xH . In this case, cannibalization
occurs such that the rm produces more of good L and less of good H. For example, the
iPad Mini cannibalized sales of the larger iPad.17
5 Concluding Remarks
Highlighting a within-product network externality, this paper has theoretically analyzed
multi-product monopoly behavior and the resulting market congurations. In particular,
I focused on a monopoly model where a single rm sells two dierentiated products (
low- and high-quality goods) in a market with a within-goods network externality.
The notable result is that the rm prot is U-shaped in the production cost of the
high-quality good. This result implies that the rm prot may decrease in spite of a
cost reduction. Then, I have shown that two assumptions, the fullled expectations
equilibrium and multi-product monopoly, yield the counterintuitive result. Moreover, I
addressed the two cases in which (i) the two goods are partially and fully compatible
and (ii) a rm's announcement of its output partially and perfectly aects consumer ex-
pectations, and established that when a within-product network externality exists, the
rm prot is U-shaped except for two polar cases in which the two goods are completely
compatible and in which a rm's announcement perfectly inuences on consumer ex-
pectations. In addition, I analyzed the eect of a change in the production cost of the
high-quality good on welfare, nding that welfare is also U-shaped in the cost.
Furthermore, I highlighted that changes in the production cost and in the quality of
the high-quality good aect the quantities. Moreover, by using the example of canni-
balization, I found that an increase (decrease) in the production cost of the high-quality
good and a decrease (increase) in its quality bring about cannibalization, such that the
rm raises (reduces) the output of the high-quality good while it reduces (raises) the
output of the low-quality good.
In this paper, I exclusively focused on a monopoly model without choosing product
17See the internet articles by Keizer (2012) and Seward (2013).
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compatibility, but future studies should aim to analyze a model when the rm can choose
a compatible product with a xed cost of making its products compatible.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
According to Eqs. (2) and (4), for arbitrary  > ^i, from (2) and (6), we have
UL(b)  UL(L) = ^ + geL   pL   (L + geL   pL)
= ^   L > 0;
for arbitrary type  2 ( L; b): Then,
UH()  UL() = (1 + ) + (1 + )geH   pH      geL + pL
=    fpH   pL   ((1 + )geH   geL)g
> ^   fpH   pL   ((1 + )geH   geL)g
= 0:
From (2) and (6), we have
UL(b)  UL(L) = ^ + geL   pL   (L + geL   pL)
= ^   L > 0;
for arbitrary type  2 ( L; b):
Proof of Proposition 1
From equilibrium outcome (11), we have @xH=@cH < 0 and @x

L=@cH > 0:
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Proof of Proposition 28><>:
@2
@c2H
= 2f(2 )
2+2g
Z2
> 0
@
@cH
jcH=cH =  rf(2 ) g(2 )Z < 0; @

@cH
jcH=cH = 2r(2 )Z > 0:
Proof of Lemma 3
The individual prots from producing goods H and L are given by
H =
fcH(2 )+rf( 2+)+ggfcHf(2 ) g+r(1+)f( 2+)+2gg
Z2
L =
f 2cH+r(1+)gf cH+2rf( 1+)+gg
Z2
;
respectively, so that8<:
@H
@cH
jcH=cH =  rZ < 0;
@2H
@c2H
= 2(2 )(2  )
Z2
> 0
@L
@cH
jcH=cH = rZ > 0;
@2L
@c2H
= 4
Z
> 0:
Proof of Proposition 3
The equilibrium outcomes for 0 <   1 are obtained as follows.
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
xH =
(2 )fr(1+) cHg rf2 (1+)g
Z
; xL =
(1+)(2 ) fr(1+) cHg(2 )
Z
pH =
r(1+)(2( 1)+f2 (1 )g+cHf(1 )( 3++) f 2+(3 2) (1 2)2gg
Z
pL =
2rf( 1)+f1+ 1)gg+(1 )cHg
Z
 = 1
Z2
h
f(2  )2 + (1  )22gc2H + 2rf 2(1  )22 + 2( 2 + )f2  (1  )g+ (1  )f4 + (2  3)ggcH
+r2(1 + )f4(1  )22 + 2f2  (1  )g2   (1  )f8  5(1  )gg
i
;
where Z = (1   )( +    4) + f4   2(2   ) + (1   2)2g > 0. Furthermore,
cH < cH < cH where cH = (1 + )(1  )r=(2  ) and cH = frf(1 + )(2  ) 
f2  (1 + )gg=(2  ).
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Then, (
@
@cH
jcH=cH =  rf(2 ) (1 )g(2 )Z < 0
@
@cH
jcH=cH = 2(1 )r(2 )Z  0:
Thus, the rm prot is U-shaped in cH except for the case of  = 1.
Proof of Proposition 4
The equilibrium outcomes for 0    1 are given as follows:8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
xH =
(2  )f(1+)r cHg 2r
Z
; xL =
2cH (1+)(1+)r
Z
pH =
cHf 3+( 1+)+2+( 1+)( 2++)g+r(1+)f(1+)( 2+)+f2 (1+3)+(1+)2gg
Z
pL =
 cH( 1+)+rf(1+)( 2+)+f2 2(1+)+(1+)2gg
Z
 = 1
Z2
h
f( 1 + )( 2 +  + )2 + f + 2(5  2)   32   (8  6 + 2)ggc2H
+2rf(1 + )22( 2 + ) + 2( 1 + )( 2 +  + )2 + f4  3 + 232 + 2( 7 + 4) + 2(4  5 + 2)ggcH
+r2(1 + )f( 1  )f(1 + )( 2 + ) + f2  2(1 + ) + (1 + )2gg
 f(1 + ) + ( 2 +  + )gf(1 + )( 2 + ) + f2  (1 + 3) + (1 + )2ggg
i
;
where Z = (1+)(2  )2 4 > 0 if and only if 0 <  < 2(1+ 
p
1 + )=(1+)(1+).
Furthermore, cH < cH < cH where cH = (1 + )(1 + )r=2 and cH = rf2   (1 +
)(1 + )g=(2     ).
Then, (
@
@cH
jcH=cH =  rff 1+( 3)+
2g+f2 (1+3)+(1+)2g
Z
< 0
@
@cH
jcH=cH = 2(1 )r(2  )Z  0:
Thus, the rm prot is U-shaped in cH except for the case of  = 1.
Proof of Proposition 6
Straightforward manipulations give
@xH
@
=
(2  )f(2  )2cH   2rg
Z2
> 0;
@xL
@
=
 2f(2  )2cH   2rg
Z2
< 0:
17
References
[1] Baake, P. and Boom, A. (2001), \Vertical product dierentiation, network external-
ities, and compatibility decisions," International Journal of Industrial Organization,
19, pp.267-284.
[2] Barrett, B. B. and Yang, Y. N. (2001), \Rational incompatibility with international
product standards," Journal of International Economics, 54, pp.171-191.
[3] Chen, H-C. and Chen, C-C. (2011), \Compatibility under dierentiated duopoly
with network externalities," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 11, pp.43-
55.
[4] Copulsky, W. (1976), \Cannibalization in the marketplace," Journal of Marketing,
October, pp.103-105.
[5] Desai, P. S. (2001), \Quality Segmentation in a Spatial Markets: When Does Can-
nibalization Aect Product Line Design?," Marketing Science, 20, No3, pp.265-283.
[6] Ghose, A., Smith, M. D., and Telang, R. (2006), \Internet exchanges for used books:
An empirical analysis of product cannibalization and welfare impact," Information
Systems Research, 17(1), pp.3-19.
[7] Hahn, J. (2003), \Nonlinear pricing telecommunications with call and network ex-
ternalities," International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21, pp.949-967.
[8] Haruvy, E. and Prasad, A. (1998), \Optimal product strategies in the presence of
network externalities," Information Economics and Policy, 10, pp.489-499.
[9] Katz, M. and Shapiro, C. (1985), \Network externalities, competition, and compat-
ibility," American Economic Review, 75(3), pp.424-440.
[10] Katz, M. and Shapiro, C. (1994), \Systems competition and network eects," The
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8(2), pp.93-115.
18
[11] Keizer, G. (2012), \iPad Mini cannibalization may add just 3M
to Apple's tablet sales, says analyst," in COMPUTERWORLD,
http://computerworld.com/s/article/print/9234310/iPad Mini cannibalization.
[12] Kitamura, R. (2013), \A theoretical analysis of the smart phone industry," Master's
Thesis in Economics, Graduate School of Economics, (unpublished ) Kwansei Gakuin
University, Nishinomiya, 67 pages.
[13] Kitamura, R. and Shinkai, T. (2013), \The economics of cannibalization: A duopoly
in which rms supply two vertically dierentiated products," Discussion Paper Series
No.100, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, Nishinomiya, 14 pages.
[14] Lahiri, S. and Ono, Y. (1988), \Helping Minor Firms Reduces Welfare," The Eco-
nomic Journal, Vol. 98, No. 393, pp. 1199-1202.
[15] Seward, Z. M. (2013), \Yes, the iPad Mini is cannibalizing sales of the
larger iPad," http://qz.com/47265/apple-ipad-mini-is-cannibalizing-sales-of-the-
larger-ipad/. Last accessed December 25, 2013.
[16] Shy, O. (2001), The Economics of Network Industries. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
[17] Smith, M. D. and Telang, R. (2008), \Internet exchanges for used digital goods: Em-
pirical analysis and managerial implications," Research Showcase, Carnegie Mellon
University, 19 pages.
19
Figure 1 (r = 1;  = 1=2;  = 1)
Figure 2 (r = 1;  = 1=2;  = 1)
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